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This paper has two goals. First, it evaluates the empirical evidence of in-
creasing the chances of ﬁnancial crises induced by opening up developing
countries to short-term capital inﬂows. Second, it appraises the various
proposals made for mitigating the severity of ﬁnancial crises. We argue that
there is solid evidence that ﬁnancial opening increases the chance of ﬁnan-
cial crises. There is more tenuous evidence that ﬁnancial opening con-
tributes positively to long-run growth. Hence, there may be a complex
trade-oﬀbetween the adverse intermediate run and the beneﬁcial long-run
eﬀects of ﬁnancial opening. These ﬁndings impose the challenge to policy
makers of how to supplement ﬁnancial opening with policies that would
improve this intertemporal trade-oﬀ. The literature abounds with propos-
als aimed at reducing the costs of ﬁnancial crises, yet there has been limited
progress in designing credible reforms to deal with these challenges.
To put this issue in a broader context, the debate about ﬁnancial open-
ing is a reincarnation of the earlier immiserizing-growth literature that
identiﬁed conditions under which growth may be welfare reducing in the
presence of preexisting distortions.1 While ﬁnancial opening increases
welfare when the only distortion is restricting intertemporal trade across
countries, ﬁnancial opening may be welfare reducing in the presence of
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1. See Johnson (1967), Bhagwati (1968), and Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977).other distortions. An important example of such a distortion is moral haz-
ard, which frequently acts as an implicit subsidy to borrowing and invest-
ment.2 Moral hazard arises when investors believe they will be bailed out
of bad investment by the taxpayer. This bailing out may be carried out by
the treasury, the central bank, or by international agencies (e.g., the Inter-
national Monetary Fund [the IMF], World Bank, etc.). In these circum-
stances, the taxpayer subsidizes the investment.
A frequent rationale for the bailing out is the “too big to fail” doctrine—
the fear that allowing large borrowers to go under will trigger a systemic
crisis (this fear is referred to as the “systemic risk”). See Dooley and Shin
(2000) and Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri (2001) for empirical validations
of the moral-hazard interpretation in the context of the recent crisis in the
Far East. It can be shown that the moral-hazard argument applies even in
the absence of any bail out and in circumstances where the investment is
debt ﬁnanced, and the riskiness of investment is private information. This
result follows from the nature of the limited-liability system, which implies
that the value of the ﬁrm behaves as an option, thus leading to excessive
risk taking (see Aizenman 2003).
In ﬁnancial autarky, the pool of domestic savings conﬁnes the cost of the
moral-hazard distortion. Financial opening implies that the scale of in-
vestment will be determined by the access to global saving. In autarky, if
the domestic real interest rate exceeded the global one, the resultant inﬂow
of capital would magnify the existing distortion, thereby reducing welfare.
This situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 12.1, where S depicts domestic saving,
and I is the domestic investment in the absence of moral hazard. Moral
hazard would shift the eﬀective investment to I . In these circumstances,
the welfare cost of moral hazard is given by the black triangle in panel A
(where the benchmark for evaluating welfare in panel A is ﬁnancial autarky
in the absence of moral hazard). If the global interest rate is r∗, ﬁnancial
opening in the presence of moral hazard reduces welfare by the shaded tri-
angle (where the benchmark for evaluating welfare in panel B is the welfare
with open ﬁnancial markets in the absence of moral hazard). If the supply
of domestic saving is relatively inelastic, whereas the demand for invest-
ment is relatively elastic, ﬁnancial opening will tend to reduce welfare. A
similar argument applies to other distortions.
The more recent literature dealing with welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial open-
ing added to the earlier studies by modeling the process of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation. A key diﬀerence between the earlier literature and the ones
dealing with ﬁnancial intermediation is the switch in focus from the com-
mercial to the ﬁnancial aspects of opening up. This matters, as the adjust-
ment of ﬁnancial markets to news and policies is much faster than that of
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2. See McKinnon and Pill (1996); Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999); Dooley (2000);
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Fig. 12.1 Financial opening, moral hazard, and welfare: A, Financial autarky; 
B, Financial integration
commercial ﬂows of goods and services. A by-product of this switch is the
focus of the new literature on conditions leading to the instantaneous re-
versal in the ﬂow of ﬁnancial assets, which generates ﬁnancial crises.
This recent literature has led to a spirited debate concerning the wisdom
of unrestricted capital mobility between the Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD) and emerging markets. Various
studies have identiﬁed circumstances in which unlimited capital mobility
may be suboptimal (see table 12.1for a summary of some of these studies).
Notwithstanding the aforementioned debate, the strongest argument for
ﬁnancial opening is the pragmatic one. Like it or not, greater trade inte-
gration erodes the eﬀectiveness of restrictions on capital mobility. Hence,
for successful emerging markets that engage in trade integration, ﬁnancial
opening is not a question of if, but of when and how. Consequently, the
pragmatic approach to the problem should recognize that there is no quick
ﬁx to the exposure to ﬁnancial crises induced by ﬁnancial opening. In-
stead, the challenge is to reduce the depth and the frequency of the crises.
The core of the problem is that we deal with incomplete ﬁnancial markets,
exposing the creditors to sovereign risk and moral hazard.3 As there are
fundamental reasons for the incompletion of these markets, one doubts
whether or not a smart ﬁx exists that will prevent future crises. Instead, the
hope is that new policies and improved coordination will reduce the sever-
ity of ﬁnancial crises, thereby improving the odds of a positive long-run
welfare eﬀect of ﬁnancial opening.
Section 12.2 starts with the review of the empirical evidence. Section
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Table 12.1 The Welfare Eﬀects of Financial Opening—Theory
The Welfare Eﬀect of 
Financial Opening Explanation
Potentially large beneﬁts Financial opening may lead to large beneﬁts stemming from better risk
pooling, information collection, and maturity transformation, thereby
providing deeper liquidity (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Obstfeld
1994; Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1998).
Positive but small beneﬁts  Second-order magnitude gains from international diversiﬁcation of 
from ﬁnancial opening output risk (Cole and Obstfeld 1991).
Ambiguous welfare eﬀects If production does involve learning by doing, opening capital markets
does not necessarily improve welfare for the nation or for the world as a
whole (Kohn and Marion 1992). Overborrowing due to moral hazard
and euphoric expectations, leading to crises (McKinnon and Pill 1996;
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1999); overborrowing due to congestion
externalities, where atomistic agents do not internalize the full eﬀects of
marginal borrowing on future welfare (Aizenman 1989); and overbor-
rowing due to free-rider problems in economies short of international
collateral, a condition generated by imperfections of the domestic capi-
tal market (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001). Emerging markets are
more prone to ﬁnancial crashes. This will be the case when ﬁnancial
market capitalization depends on the expectations of agents regarding
aggregate investment in their economy. This gives rise to potential coor-
dination failures, which may be exacerbated for low-income countries
by ﬁnancial globalization (Martin and Rey 2001).
3. For a review of the literature on sovereign risk, see Eaton and Fernandez (1995).12.3 reviews the various proposals attempting to reform the global ﬁnan-
cial system. Section 12.4 provides an appraisal of the various proposals
made for preventing ﬁnancial crises. Speciﬁcally, it argues that a version of
the Lucas critique may limit the welfare gain of these proposals. Of course,
this is not an argument against adopting reforms. It suggests, however, that
a better understanding of the structural characteristics leading to exposure
and crises is the key for designing a successful restructuring of the capital
market. A reform that would not deal with these structural factors runs the
risk of leading to disappointing welfare gains, at best, and to crises in the
worst case. Some of the reforms may fall short of success due to coordina-
tion failure: They may be eﬀective only if they would be adopted com-
prehensively by all the relevant ﬁnancial centers. Finally, some of the pro-
posals may be too optimistic, ignoring the time inconsistency and
political-economy considerations that would challenge the practicality of
the best-intended reforms, as well as presuming the ability to verify unam-
biguously the quality of macroeconomic adjustment.
12.2 Financial Opening and Financial Crises: The Evidence
The recent research has two common themes: It validated empirically
the assertion “Good-bye ﬁnancial repression, hello ﬁnancial crash” (Diaz-
Alejandro 1985), yet it also found tenuous evidence that ﬁnancial liberal-
ization tends to increase growth over time. Both observations suggest an
intertemporal trade-oﬀ. In the short run, the fragility induced by ﬁnancial
opening leads frequently to crises, but if these crises would force the coun-
try to deal with its structural deﬁciencies, ﬁnancial opening may induce
a higher growth rate in the long run. The empirical literature relies fre-
quently on cross-country methodology. Thus, it provides us with little
guidance in evaluating the net-welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial opening. For ex-
ample, it remains hard to gauge if Korea would have been better oﬀ by re-
fraining from ﬁnancial opening in the early 1990s, or if Chile would have
beneﬁted by retaining ﬁnancial repression in the 1980s and 1990s.4The an-
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4. Obviously, the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis had an adverse impact on Korea’s welfare. One may
argue, however, that it prevented a much deeper and longer calamity, akin to Japan’s reces-
sion in the last ten years. Arguably, had Korea continued with ﬁnancial repression, a Japan-
ese type of a correction would have hit Korea later. Korea’s development path resembles that
of Japan—its domestic banks accumulated over time large nonperforming loans. These loans
were the heritage of the earlier development strategy in which large corporations had selec-
tive access to preferential lines of credit. According to this argument, the crisis of 1997 pre-
vented a larger buildup of these loans, saving Korea from a much deeper correction. Obvi-
ously, it is hard to provide a sound test of this argument. See Haggard (2000) for further
discussion on the interaction between the public and the private sector in Korea and other
countries in the Far East. Similar ambiguities apply to Chile, which has been the best per-
forming Latin American country in recent years and is credited with a sound banking system.
Yet, Chile experienced a massive banking crisis in the 1980s following earlier ﬁnancial open-
ing. Arguably, one may credit the superior recent performance of Chile to the painful earlier
reforms that were triggered by the crises of the early 1980s.swers to these questions depend crucially on the time horizon of the anal-
ysis as well as on the evaluation of what is the relevant counterfactual; both
are issues to which there are no satisfactory answers.5
We illustrate the empirical literature by reviewing selectively several ex-
amples. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) found that problems in the bank-
ing sector typically precede a currency crisis and that a currency crisis
deepens the banking crisis, activating a vicious spiral. Importantly, they
also found that ﬁnancial liberalization often precedes banking crises. Sim-
ilar results were replicated in several papers using diﬀerent methodologies.
Glick and Hutchison (1999) investigated a sample of ninety countries dur-
ing 1975 to 1997, covering 90 banking crises, 202 currency crises, and 37
twin crises. They found that banking and twin crises have occurred mainly
in developing countries, and their number increased in the 1990s. Twin
crises are mainly concentrated in ﬁnancially liberalized emerging-market
economies. These ﬁndings support the conjecture that openness of emerg-
ing markets to international capital ﬂows, combined with a liberalized ﬁ-
nancial structure, makes them particularly vulnerable to twin crises. The
costs of these crises are substantial. Currency crisis, on average, leads to a
cost of 8 percent of precrisis gross domestic product (GDP). Simultaneous
currency and banking crises reduce the precrisis GDP by 18 percent
(World Bank 1998; Caprio and Honohan 1999).
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) studied the empirical relation-
ship between banking crises and ﬁnancial liberalization in ﬁfty-three coun-
tries during 1980 to 1995. They found that banking crises are more likely
to occur in liberalized ﬁnancial systems. The impact of ﬁnancial liberal-
ization on the fragility of banks is weaker, however, when the institutional
environment is strong. (Relevant institutional characteristics are respect
for the rule of law, a low level of corruption, and good contract enforce-
ment.) They found that banks’ franchise values decline after ﬁnancial lib-
eralization. Hence, the intensiﬁcation of the moral hazard associated with
lower franchise values may be one of the sources of increased banking-
sector fragility. Financial liberalization is followed by improved ﬁnancial
development, while banking crises tend to slow it down. In countries that
liberalize from a position of ﬁnancial repression, ﬁnancial development
improves even if a banking crisis takes place. Their results support the view
that ﬁnancial liberalization should be approached cautiously where the in-
stitutions necessary to ensure law and contract enforcement and eﬀective
prudential regulation and supervision are not fully developed, even if
macroeconomic stabilization has been achieved.
A useful survey of ﬁnancial liberalization is Williamson and Mahar
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5. A welfare evaluation of these issues may depend on the degree to which there are politi-
cal economy trade-oﬀs between a large crisis versus a series of smaller crises; a large crisis may
be needed to overcome entrenched opposing interest groups, yet it may lead to larger welfare
costs.(1998), who focused on thirty-four countries that undertook ﬁnancial lib-
eralization between 1973 to 1996. Overall, they found a mixed record of
ﬁnancial liberalization—the gains are there, but the liberalization carries
the risk of leading to ﬁnancial crisis. Financial liberalization has yielded
greater ﬁnancial depth, and increased eﬃciency in the allocation of invest-
ment, yet it has not brought a boost in saving. The drawbacks in the liber-
alization process are the danger that the liberalization will lead to a ﬁnan-
cial crisis. For the majority of countries, capital-account liberalization
increases its probability. The challenge is to design a liberalization program
that does not bring a ﬁnancial crisis in its wake. The main recommen-
dations emerging from their study are akin to Hellman, Murdock, and
Stiglitz (2000); start with macroeconomic stabilization and improve bank
supervision while delaying capital-account convertibility until the end of
the process. In the transition, mild ﬁnancial repression, in the form of a
ceiling on deposit interest rates, may be advantageous. This follows from
the observation that exceedingly high interest rates encourage risk taking
by borrowers—that is, moral hazard induced by self-selection. Banks in
stress may wish to gamble for resurrection by lending to such borrowers,
which is ultimately at a cost to the taxpayer. Williamson and Mahar con-
clude that maintaining high spreads may be needed in a transition until
banks are able to work oﬀ the legacy of bad debt inherited from the period
of ﬁnancial repression. In such an environment, free entry of foreign banks
may be a mixed blessing. The eﬃciency gains should be balanced against
the threat of the gamble for resurrection by older domestic banks that are
losing their franchise value. Imposing higher capital requirements in-
creases the cost of a gamble-for-resurrection strategy. In these circum-
stances, deposit-rate controls may complement capital requirements.
The overall eﬀect of ﬁnancial opening on growth remains debatable.
Levine (1997) found a positive association, whereas Rodrik (1998) failed to
depict any positive eﬀects of ﬁnancial opening on investment, growth, and
inﬂation. While Levine’s interpretation attaches the direction of causality
from ﬁnancial deepening to growth, the old dictum that correlations do
not indicate causality remains valid. More recently, Beck, Levine, and
Loayza (2000) evaluated the empirical links between the level of ﬁnancial
intermediary development and economic growth, total factor productivity
(TFP) growth, physical-capital accumulation, and private-savings rates.
The main ﬁndings are that ﬁnancial intermediaries exert a large, positive
impact on total-factor-productivity growth, which feeds through to over-
all GDP growth. Yet, the long-run links between ﬁnancial intermediary de-
velopment and both physical-capital growth and private-savings rates are
tenuous. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) found that equity-market
liberalizations, on average, lead to a one percent increase in annual real
economic growth over a ﬁve-year period. The investment-GDP ratio in-
creases postliberalization, with the investment partially ﬁnanced by for-
Financial Opening: Evidence and Policy Options 479eign capital, which inducing worsened trade balances. The liberalization
eﬀect is enhanced by a large secondary-school enrollment, a small govern-
ment sector, and an Anglo-Saxon legal system.6
Rodrik’s earlier methodology has been revisited by Arteta, Eichengreen,
and Wyplosz (2001). While they found indications of a positive association
between capital-account liberalization and growth, the eﬀects vary with
time, with how capital account liberalization is measured, and with how
the relationship is estimated. The evidence that the eﬀects of capital-
account liberalization are stronger in high-income countries is fragile.
There is some evidence that the positive growth eﬀects of liberalization are
stronger in countries with strong institutions. Capital-account liberaliza-
tion appears to have positive eﬀects on growth only in countries that have
already opened more generally, hence sequencing matters. But there are
signiﬁcant prerequisites for opening, including a reduction of trade barri-
ers and an ability to eliminate macroeconomic imbalances. These conclu-
sions are akin to Edwards (2001a) who reported that, after controlling for
other variables (including aggregate investment), countries with a more
open capital account have outperformed countries that have restricted
capital mobility. There is also evidence that an open capital account aﬀects
growth positively only after a country has achieved a certain degree of eco-
nomic development. This provides support to the view that there is an op-
timal sequencing for capital account liberalization.
12.3 Proposals for Preventing Financial Crises 
Induced by Financial Opening
This section provides a brief summary of the various proposals.7 These
reforms can be classiﬁed along several dimensions. First, proposals diﬀer
in the weight given to reforming the incentives facing creditors, debtors, or
to the interaction between the two groups. Second, proposals diﬀer in the
weight given to ex ante risk reduction, versus ex post orderly management
and resolution of actual crises. Third, proposals diﬀer in the depth of the
reform. Some deal with upgrading regulations within the existing institu-
tional environment, whereas others suggest bolder steps, envisioning the
creation of new institutions. Table 12.2 summarizes the main proposals.
One line of reform focuses on the possibility that, by subsidizing sover-
eign borrowing, the involvement of institutions may exacerbate the prob-
lem, inducing moral hazard. For example, the belief that the IMF, World
Bank, and banking-deposit-insurances schemes will bail out creditors gen-
erates overborrowing and ends with more frequent and deeper crises at the
480 Joshua Aizenman
6. As is frequently the case with empirical studies relying on marcrodata, endogeneity and
reverse causality remain a valid concern in interpreting some of these results.
7. Several recent monographs overviewed comprehensively the various proposals; see
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.taxpayers’ expense. A profound reform of the IMF, as suggested by the
Meltzer committee (Meltzer 1998), would restrict the IMF’s role to help-
ing countries meeting ex ante conditionality (see also Jeanne 2003). An-
other radical approach calls for the formation of a global lender of last re-
sort (see Soros 1998), an approach that would institutionalize a global type
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) arrangement. All
these proposals share the concern of minimizing ex post bailouts that were
not preapproved at the lending stage.
A less aggressive approach to provide greater stability is the imposition
of reserve requirements on lenders, borrowers, or both, as well as the pos-
sibility of capital-adequacy requirements that are linked to the bank’s port-
folio risk. The Basle committee (as well as Greenspan 1998) advocates this
approach. The rationale for the reserve requirements is provided by the
presence of various externalities. On the lender’s side, the anticipation of
bailouts is introducing an externality, where marginal lending has adverse
impacts on the taxpayer. On the borrower’s side, as long as partial defaults
are costly, marginal borrowing aﬀects all agents by increasing the proba-
bility of a costly default that would have an impact on all (see Aizenman
and Turnovsky 2002). Alternatively, emerging markets may enact similar
policies aimed at curbing short-term ﬁnancial ﬂows, akin to the Chilean
system in the 1990s (see Eichengreen 1999).8
A diﬀerent tack of reforms has focused on the ex post resolution of
crises. One approach advocates institutionalizing ex ante the possibility of
credit relief in bad times. This may be accomplished by attaching to all for-
eign-currency liabilities the option that entitles the borrowers to extend the
debt for a speciﬁed period at a mandatory penalty rate (see Buiter and Sib-
ert 1999). In order to facilitate the coordination among large numbers of
diﬀused lenders, various proposals advocate deeper institutional changes.
The adoption of a modiﬁed version of domestic bankruptcy procedure
has been frequently advocated (see Sachs 1995; Miller and Zhang 2000;
Kreuger 2001). Speciﬁcally, such an international workout mechanism
would aim at minimizing the cost of protracted negotiations. It would al-
low the debtor the continuation of export and production with minimal
disturbances. It would also serve to coordinate among the diﬀused credi-
tors, thereby allowing smoother and faster resolution of the standoﬀ be-
tween the involved parties.
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8. See De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (2000) for a mixed review of Chile’s experience
with controls on inﬂows. Edwards (2001b, 25) concludes that these controls “were successful
in changing the maturity proﬁle of capital inﬂows, and of the country’s foreign debt. Also, the
controls allowed the monetary authority to have greater control over monetary policy. This
eﬀect, however, appears to have been conﬁned to the short run, and was not very important
quantitatively.” In evaluating Chile’s experience, one should keep in mind that Chile has been
the best performing country in Latin America in recent years. Hence, Chile’s experience may
provide limited inference about the potential beneﬁts of controls on inﬂows to countries with
more-fragile ﬁnancial systems.12.4 Reforming the Financial System: The Challenges
The growing list of proposed reforms is indicative of the emerging con-
sensus that the present ﬁnancial architecture needs a major overhaul.
While it is easy to point out the ﬂaws of the existing system, any funda-
mental reform will confront a host of challenges. We review brieﬂy some of
the general issues involved and illustrate their relevance in understanding
the limitations of various proposals.
12.4.1 The Lucas Critique: Political Economy and Coordination Failure
Any signiﬁcant reform will change agents’ behavior in ways that are hard
to predict without understanding the fundamental forces explaining sov-
ereign borrowing and default. Some of the relevant fundamentals are de-
termined by the political-economy characterization of emerging markets
and by the challenges confronting attempts to deal with coordination fail-
ures. A version of the Lucas critique applies; without a fuller understand-
ing of the fundamental forces leading to exposure and crises, suggested
reforms may lead to disappointing results, at best, and welfare reduction at
worst.9 We illustrate these considerations by analyzing the potential pit-
falls in several proposed reforms.
12.4.2 Debt Maturity Structure
Jeanne (2003) illustrates the importance of understanding the forces
leading to vulnerability as a necessary condition for evaluating the welfare
eﬀects of changing the international ﬁnancial architecture. Speciﬁcally, he
focused on understanding the maturity structure of countries’ external lia-
bilities as the solution to an incentives problem. He considered a country
attempting to borrow when there is uncertainty about its solvency due to
exogenous shocks. The country can enhance its solvency by implementing
a costly ﬁscal adjustment, and it can borrow on a short-term or a long-term
basis. This situation imposes a trade-oﬀ—when government’s solvency de-
teriorates, short-term debt becomes less expensive or more accessible than
long-term debt. This comes with a cost: The government is under more
pressure to restore the ﬁscal situation if its debt has a shorter maturity be-
cause it is more vulnerable to a crisis in which creditors do not roll over
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9. The Lucas critique stresses that economic relationships observed would be modiﬁed
when policies or economic conditions change. This result follows from the observation that
changes in policies aﬀect the incentives and the budget constraints facing economic agents.
Hence, new policies would alter the behavior of agents, thereby modifying the observed cor-
relations. If policymakers attempt to take advantage of past statistical relationships, the
eﬀects manipulating thought expectations and agents’ behavior may cause the relationships
to break down (See Lucas 1976). Applications of the Lucas critique include the Phillips curve
(illustrating the ineﬀectiveness of anticipated monetary policy) and the ineﬀectiveness of tem-
porary changes in taxes.their claims. This is due to the observation that short-term debt opens the
door to self-fulﬁlling crises in which creditors stop rolling over their loans
for an extraneous reason unrelated to the fundamentals. There is a tension,
thus, between the disciplinary beneﬁts of short-term debt and the risk of
unwarranted rollover crises.
In this context, Jeanne investigates the welfare eﬀect of institutions that
facilitate an orderly workout of debt crises (e.g., an international bank-
ruptcy court and oﬃcially sanctioned standstills) and of international
lender of last resort. These measures are shown to improve welfare but to
fall short of the ﬁrst best. The ﬁrst best in Jeanne’s model is achieved by a
crisis-insurance fund, which ex post bails out countries conditional on the
ex ante ﬁscal adjustment and payment of a risk premium.
12.4.3 Transparency and the Feasibility of the Crisis-Insurance Fund
Conditional on Ex Ante Adjustment Eﬀort
It is noncontroversial that a minimum level of transparency of ﬁnancial
positions and policies is a necessary condition for ﬁnancial markets to exist
and to operate,10yet it is not clear that greater transparency would eliminate
the exposure to crises. Setting standards for transparency may encourage
creative accounting in which each crisis exposes new loopholes, inducing a
change in the required rules of the game. While “transparency creep” is un-
avoidable, putting too much faith in the importance of transparency may
lead some investors to a false sense of security. Indeed, full information does
not negate the possibility of crises induced by multiple equilibria.
One of the innovative proposals dealing with reforming the IMF is to
insure countries against ﬁnancial crises only if they met ex ante criteria
(seeJeanne 2003; Meltzer 1998). A necessary condition for such a schemeis
transparency. In practice, however, veriﬁcation is costly and fuzzy. Fre-
quently, it takes a major crisis to force the “real books” to open (see the
case of Korean’s reserves in the 1997 crisis, and the recent Enron ﬁasco).
These practical considerations suggest that it is only in the aftermath of a
crisis that we learn the degree to which the ex ante criteria were met, since
a crisis may reveal that some of these criteria were met only superﬁcially. It
may be hard to verify ex ante if the institutional environment changed
enough to warrant the insurance. Hence, costly monitoring and the im-
possibility to fully verify the depth of the adjustment limit the applicabil-
ity of this proposal. In these circumstances, we are left with no clean solu-
tions, and there may be no escape from the need to muddle through
protracted negotiations in the aftermath of crises.
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10. For example, greater uncertainty about the net indebtness of a country would lead to
thinner markets and may eventually lead to the collapse of voluntary lending (see Kletzer
1984; Calvo 2002; Aizenman and Marion 2002b).12.4.4 The Use (and Abuse) of International Reserves 
and Vulnerability Indicators
A high short-term debt–international reserves ratio was found to be a
vulnerability indicator, signifying exposure to crises (see Rodrik and Ve-
lasco 1999). Does it imply that emerging markets would beneﬁt by increas-
ing the cushion of international reserves, signaling thereby they are being
a safer borrower? Countries like Chile, Korea, and Taiwan have managed
large stocks of international reserves. Does it follow that other countries
will beneﬁt from hoarding more international reserves in order to reduce
the above-vulnerability index? As the Lucas critique would suggest, a
deeper understanding of the economy is needed in order to answer this
question.
This point can be illustrated in a model of emerging markets, where there
is a conﬂict between eﬃciency and political economy considerations.
Speciﬁcally, countries characterized by sovereign risk, tax-collection costs,
inelastic demand for ﬁscal outlays, and a volatile GDP opt to engage in
large external borrowing. Suppose that international reserves are beyond
creditors’ control (this would be the case if the location and the magnitude
of the reserves is not public information, implying also that the partial de-
fault repayment is independent of the stock of reserves). In the absence of
political-economy considerations, higher borrowing can be shown to be
accompanied with a greater accumulation of international reserves (see
Aizenman and Marion 2002a). While this adjustment is welfare enhanc-
ing, it may do little to prevent a sovereign-debt crisis. Suppose now that
there is political uncertainty regarding the identity of the future adminis-
tration; there is a positive probability that an opportunistic administration
will loot the treasury and channel resources toward narrow interest groups.
Greater political instability can be shown to reduce the demand for inter-
national reserves and to increase borrowing.11 Hence, the association be-
tween external borrowing and international reserves depends critically on
political-economy factors. A high short-term debt–reserve ratio may be
the symptom of political instability. In these circumstances, a policy that
will target a drop in the short-term debt–international reserves ratio, with-
out dealing with the political-economy considerations that determine the
prospect of future looting, is welfare reducing. Such a policy does not nec-
essarily reduce vulnerability to crisis, and, in fact, it may increase the prob-
ability of a crisis.
This would be the case, for example, if the increase in the stock of re-
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11. If the present administration is opportunistic, it will loot all liquid resources, hence it
will minimize its reserves holdings and maximize borrowing. If the present administration is
benevolent, a higher probability of a future opportunistic administration will reduce the pres-
ent demand for international reserves and will increase borrowing as a way of reducing the re-
sources available for future looting.serves, triggered by policies, increases the misguided expenditure of op-
portunistic administrations in the future. This eﬀect is further magniﬁed
when the probability of the switch to the opportunistic administration
increases with the resources available to such an administration, or when
these resources trigger rent-seeking behavior. One may view this example
as an illustration of the Lucas critique—policies that are beneﬁcial in the
absence of opportunism may backﬁre and reduce welfare in countries
characterized by political polarization and instability.
Similar concerns may apply to the usefulness of vulnerability indicators.
These indicators provide information on variables correlated with past
crises. Attempts to encourage the dissemination and the use of these indi-
cators in allocating global funds may have mixed results. One doubts the
degree to which these indicators will perform in the future when they are
out of the sample used to construct them. One may also envision situations
in which the introduction of quasi-oﬃcial indicators provides a false sense
of security and in which market participants may attach too much value
to these indicators, ignoring other relevant information. It may induce
emerging markets to distort the indicators in order to signal their relative
soundness. As the previous discussion illustrated, short of deeper reforms,
these signals may be misleading and may not indicate a genuine reduction
in vulnerability.
12.4.5 Time Inconsistency and Political-Economy Considerations—
How Important Is the Choice of Exchange-Rate Regimes?
Crises are frequently the delayed manifestations of political-economy
factors. Reforms that ignore these factors run the risk of inducing too op-
timistic an assessment of countries, which, over time, leads to a large ex-
posure and ultimately to greater vulnerability. The literature on the opti-
mal exchange-rate regimes frequently attaches too much importance to the
choice of monetary policy. Beyond the short run, monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies are intertwined via the intertemporal budget constraints. Indeed, one
may argue that a deﬁcient ﬁscal system may lead to crises independently of
the exchange-rate regimes. In these circumstances, the choice of the ex-
change rate regime will have an impact only on the timing of the ultimate
crisis. After all, sovereign risk and exchange-rate risks have diﬀerent
causes. Casting the problem in terms of the “smart” choice of an exchange-
rate regime is potentially hazardous, as it obscures the need to challenge
the deeper ﬁscal deﬁciencies.
These considerations are illustrated in the contrast of the policies un-
dertaken by Brazil and Argentina in the last ﬁfteen years. In the 1980s,
both countries were characterized by similar ﬁscal deﬁciencies, stemming
from their organization as a loose federal system in which the provincial
states and municipalities had a signiﬁcant bargaining power relative to the
federal center. In the early 1990s, both countries went through successful
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ging the exchange rate, supported rapid disinﬂation in both countries. Ar-
gentina, however, put a much greater emphasis on the importance of a
peg—it adopted a rigid currency board. In contrast, Brazil put greater em-
phasis on dealing with its ﬁscal imbalances, thereby reducing the relative
power of the provincial states.12 In addition, Brazil moved over time from
a ﬁxed-exchange-rate regime towards discretionary-exchange-rate man-
agement, accommodating external adverse shocks with occasional depre-
ciations. As the recent events have painfully illustrated, Brazil’s choice al-
lowed it to steer away from a deep crisis, whereas Argentina’s choice has led
over time to increased vulnerability and ultimately to the recent crisis.
12.4.6 Multiple Equilibria and the International Lender of Last Resort
One possible justiﬁcation for bailing out countries is the presence of
multiple equilibria. Exposure to multiple equilibria is a by-product of the
maturity transformation accomplished by ﬁnancial intermediation in
which short-term deposits are used to ﬁnance longer-term real projects
(see Diamond and Dybvig 1983 for a banking model; Chang and Velasco
1999 for an open economy model of bank and currency runs). In these cir-
cumstances, the presence of the lender of last resort is supposed to prevent
the bad equilibrium. As Rogoﬀ (1999) discussed, a lender of last resort
comes with a hefty cost to the taxpayer. Some may view the fate of Ar-
gentina as an example of a country suﬀering from the adverse conse-
quences of a switch to a bad equilibrium. Supporters of this view point out
that conventional measures (e.g., current account, ﬁscal deﬁcits, etc.)
failed to ﬂag out Argentina as a highly vulnerable country in the 1990s. In-
deed, Argentina’s ﬁscal measures were comparable to those of “respected”
OECD countries. Can we infer from this that a lender of last resort would
have prevented the Argentinean crisis?
While it is hard to test this assertion, there are fundamental challenges
facing the multiple-equilibria argument. Vulnerability to a crisis may de-
pend on the capacity of an economy to adjust to changing circumstances.
This includes the ability of the ﬁscal system and the labor market to adjust
to unforeseen events. More generally, country risk may be determined by
the interaction between shocks and the quality of the institutions of con-
ﬂict management (see Rodrik 1999). In the context of Argentina, the mul-
tiple-equilibria interpretation is challenged by the view that Argentina is a
quasi-European-style welfare state standing on the shoulders of a very thin
tax base. This situation is further exacerbated by the provincial states’ bias
towards overspending. Hence, one may conclude that there are fundamen-
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12. While it’s premature to conclude that Brazil has accomplished all the adjustments called
for under the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2001, it started the painful process of curbing the
biases towards provincial overspending. See Dillinger and Webb (1999) for further details
about the reforms.tal reasons to view Argentina as a risky destination for global capital, even
if its ﬁscal deﬁcits and current-account deﬁcits are comparable to OECD
countries.
The insistence of the Argentinean authorities on preserving the currency
board, despite the growing strength of the dollar and the occasional real
depreciations of Brazilian currency, may be viewed as a manifestation of
these risks—viewing the currency board as the main safeguard against in-
ﬂation runs the hazard of providing a signal that the deeper ﬁscal problems
are still there. Placing too much faith on the currency board as the mecha-
nism for ﬁscal discipline overlooks the fact that the cost of changing the ex-
change-rate regime (and of monetary policy, more generally) is much lower
than the cost of a fundamental ﬁscal reform. Hence, a country like Ar-
gentina runs the risk of being viewed as ﬁscally unstable, independently of
the realized path of current-account and ﬁscal deﬁcits. In the long run, ac-
cording to this view, the ﬁscal side will determine the strength of the sys-
tem. Short of resolving ﬁscal deﬁciencies, a country like Argentina will ﬁnd
it hard to convince the market that it’s a prudent destination for capital.
One may rephrase the above discussion in terms of the rules-versus-
discretion literature, where there are gains from delegating monetary pol-
icy to a conservative agent. As was illustrated in Rogoﬀ’s (1985) seminal
work, the optimal commitment to the conservative course depends on the
stochastic structure. If the balance of shocks tilts over time toward adverse
real shocks, a less conservative course is preferable. The success of Brazil
and the failure of Argentina may be viewed as a vivid example of this prin-
ciple. The success of the structural reform would require also challenging
the ﬁscal deﬁciencies that determine, in the long run, the course on mone-
tary policy. Hence, the relative success of Brazil is attributed to its success
in curbing the bias towards provincial overspending and in a more appro-
priate use of discretionary-exchange-rate and monetary policy.
12.4.7 Policies Designed to Impose Discipline on the Market—
Reserve and Capital-Adequacy Requirements
The introduction of reserve requirements by either borrowers or lenders
may impose better discipline on the global ﬁnancial market. Borrowing will
decline and so will default risk, reducing the necessity for continuing
bailouts. The introduction of reserve requirements will improve welfare in
both the lending and borrowing economies. In these circumstances, the
lender’s optimal-reserve requirement increases with the expected bailout
(see Aizenman and Turnovsky 2002). Indirectly, this policy may reduce the
bias in favor of debt and against equity in international lending, identiﬁed
by Rogoﬀ(1999). But the design of the optimal-reserve requirement in a de-
centralized world is a delicate matter, and both the optimal lender’s reserve
requirement and the optimal borrower’s requirement have equally attractive
and unattractive features. Indeed, without a proper coordination among all
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reserve countries with few beneﬁcial eﬀects. Hence, the gains of such poli-
cies will be determined by the ability of international institutions (e.g., the
Bank for International Settlements [BIS], IMF, etc.) to induce all lenders to
apply similar policies, driven by the underlying risk factors.
12.5 Concluding Remarks
The global ﬁnancial market has been shaken throughout the 1990s by a
series of major ﬁnancial crises. Attempts to stabilize the global system have
led to large bailouts. This experience suggests that the present system can-
not survive indeﬁnitely, since the willingness of taxpayers in the OECD
countries to engage in continuing bailouts is approaching its limits. The
presumption is that we deal with a second-best situation in which there
is no quick ﬁx, but welfare can be enhanced by the proper regulatory
changes. While prudent borrowing of emerging-market economies is ben-
eﬁcial, excessive borrowing may be disadvantageous due to existing dis-
tortions. In such an environment, one should either reduce the existing dis-
tortions, or induce borrowers and lenders to internalize them.
Recent proposals for the new international ﬁnancial architecture have
focused on reform along two margins: reducing the ex ante probability of
a crisis and inducing the more-orderly resolution of a crisis. In evaluating
the various of proposals, it is important to stress that there are good rea-
sons to support both more-eﬀective crisis management and more-prudent
ex ante allocation of credit. As each deals with a diﬀerent margin, they
should complement each other. Speciﬁcally, the crisis-management pro-
posals do not address directly the excessive risk undertaken due to moral
hazard, as the ex post solvency of some of the resultant projects hinge on
bailouts. Similarly, improving the prudential regulations would not elimi-
nate liquidity crises. Hence, the need for more-eﬃcient crisis management
and resolution remains a high-priority issue. This is especially due to the
growing diversity of lenders, implying that the task of coordinating the res-
olution of crises is more involved.
Greater global integration increased the responsiveness of ﬁnancial
ﬂows to news. This development is potentially beneﬁcial in good times, but
it has adverse consequences when things go wrong. Hence, the darker side
of globalization is that ﬁnancial crises increase the scope for conﬂicts—the
direct stakes are higher. Once the bad news hits the market, the key issue is
not only the ultimate distribution of the burden of adjustment between the
debtors and creditors, but also the length of time it would take to settle
down the dispute. The killer of future cooperation may be the uncertainty
regarding the dispute-resolution mechanism, since it exposes creditors to
the hazards of long haggling over a shrinking pie. Protracted negotiations
will prolong the period in which both domestic and international agents re-
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aﬀected countries, increasing the social tension and further increasing
losses. The net outcome may be greater temptation for the domestic au-
thorities to embark on populist policies, which tends toward autarky, a
trend that will hurt further prospects of trade integration. Hence, the re-
cent crises may be viewed as a test case for the eﬃciency of the global dis-
pute-resolution mechanism. While one hopes that the direct ﬁnancial con-
tagion from Argentina to other countries will be limited, one expects that
a slow and protracted resolution of the crisis will highlight the inability of
the present system to deal eﬃciently with adverse shocks, thereby reducing
future ﬁnancial ﬂows and putting in jeopardy other vulnerable countries.
The urgency of these issues is illustrated by the willingness of top IMF
executives to engage constructively in a debate concerning the future form
of the global dispute-resolution mechanism (see Krueger 2001). One ex-
pects that only reforms that oﬀer practical solutions will pass the market
test and will endure the political process needed to implement them. One
doubts the degree to which “clean” ideas, like insurance based only on
meeting ex ante conditionality, will survive the time-inconsistency and the
transparency challenges. Regulatory enhancements that would use exist-
ing institutions would have a greater chance of adaptation. Examples of
such interventions are the regulations and supervision undertaken by cen-
tral banks in the context of domestic banking. One expects a more strin-
gent application of capital and reserve requirements. One expects also a
greater role for the BIS and the IMF in coordinating these regulations
across countries. Considering the greater weight of nonbank lending and
the great increase in the number of institutional investors, one expects re-
forms dealing with better coordination among creditors and with the for-
mation of international bankruptcy procedures to be vigorously tested by
looming crises.
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Comment Robert M. Stern
In Aizenman’s opening section on ﬁnancial openness and the occurrence
of ﬁnancial crises, what comes out clearly is the role of weak institutions
coupled with political economy considerations that demonstrated the un-
willingness or inability of government authorities to take timely and eﬀec-
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Michigan.tive actions in dealing with the crises. There is abundant evidence of gov-
ernment macroeconomic and ﬁnancial mismanagement in the cases espe-
cially of Mexico in 1993–1994 and several Asian countries in 1997–1998,
including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Hong Kong.
But it is interesting to note that some other Asian countries were appar-
ently less vulnerable to crisis because of their more timely and eﬀective do-
mestic policies. The Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan are cases in point.
Furthermore, China and India were not greatly aﬀected by the crises else-
where in Asia because of their long-standing capital controls.
While Aizenman is mainly concerned with the broad aspects of the oc-
currence of ﬁnancial crises, he devotes less attention to the diﬀerent re-
sponses of governments to the crises and especially to the pace of recovery.
Thus, for example, in the case of Mexico, considerable ﬁnancial assistance
was provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and bilaterally
by the United States. Moreover, with the onset of the crisis, Mexico moved
quickly to ﬂoat the peso and instituted a severe austerity program with
tight monetary and ﬁscal policies. While income and employment in Mex-
ico contracted considerably, the depreciation of the peso combined with
the rapid expansion of the U.S. economy served subsequently to bolster the
recovery process so that Mexico was able to ﬁnance the repayment of the
bailout funds within a fairly short period of time.
The ﬁnancial management experiences of the Asian countries were, as
noted, more diverse. The role of the IMF proved more controversial as to
whether it helped the recovery process or made things worse at the time,
especially in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. But some countries
chose to forgo IMF assistance altogether, as in the cases of Malaysia,
which instituted capital controls, and Hong Kong, which tightened its
macroeconomic policies and was able to maintain its ﬁxed exchange rate
and currency-board arrangement. In retrospect, what is perhaps surpris-
ing about the Asian experience, as was the case also for Mexico, is how rap-
idly the countries were able to recover from the crises, aided especially by
their currency depreciations and the signiﬁcant upturn in the demand for
their exports due to the rapid expansion of the U.S. economy in the late
1990s.
The question that emerges for several of the Asian countries noted is the
extent to which they have been able to strengthen their ﬁnancial institu-
tions so that they are now less vulnerable to crises than they were previ-
ously. Aizenman intimates that there may be an endogenous improvement
in institutions and policies once countries have experienced ﬁnancial
crises. This perhaps can now be tested to see how they are responding to
the signiﬁcant reduction of external demand with an economic slowdown
in the United States, continued slow growth in Western Europe, and stag-
nation in Japan.
When we look at experiences with ﬁnancial crises outside of Asia, the
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lowing the collapse of communism, Russia was saddled with weak ﬁnan-
cial institutions and ﬁscal inadequacies. It received considerable IMF ﬁ-
nancial assistance, which was supported by the United States for political
reasons, but this assistance proved unsuccessful, perhaps because it came
too late. Russia defaulted on a considerable portion of its debt in August
1998. But since that time, aided by the signiﬁcant depreciation of the ruble
and the upturn in world oil and other commodity prices, Russia introduced
ﬁnancial discipline and strengthened its domestic ﬁscal and regulatory
arrangements. Thus, Russia is in much better macroeconomic shape pres-
ently than it had been previously.
In the case of Brazil, the IMF provided substantial assistance designed
especially so that Brazil could maintain its exchange rate peg. But this
turned out to be unsustainable and raises the question again about the wis-
dom of IMF policies and advice. Subsequently, Brazil ﬂoated its currency
and adopted policies of monetary and ﬁscal restraints. These measures
have proven successful on the whole, although there are apparently some
concerns currently about the sustainability of the ﬁscal restraints because
of domestic political opposition.
Turkey has received considerable IMF assistance and has been sup-
ported politically by the United States because of Turkey’s importance as
an ally in the Middle East. But it is not clear if Turkey’s macroeconomic
position is sustainable because of insuﬃcient domestic measures and politi-
cal uncertainties. In any case, Turkey is so large and important to both U.S.
and European interests that there will almost certainly be continued exter-
nal ﬁnancial support and encouragement of more eﬀective domestic mea-
sures to control inﬂation and restrain expenditures.
It is well established that the maintenance of the currency-board ar-
rangement in Argentina deprived Argentina of the use of monetary pol-
icy for stabilization purposes and exchange rate adjustments for external
balance. Argentina was thus especially vulnerable to the Brazilian cur-
rency depreciation that occurred. Fiscal inadequacies and inﬂexible labor-
market arrangements made it diﬃcult for Argentina to adjust. Here, also,
the IMF provided considerable ﬁnancial assistance that proved to be in-
eﬀective, thereby raising the question once again about whether IMF as-
sistance helped or made matters worse. The Argentine case is sad indeed
because of the social consequences of the mismanagement involved on the
part of the domestic authorities and the maintenance of the ultimately un-
sustainable exchange rate arrangement. The IMF has been reluctant to
provide further ﬁnancial assistance under current circumstances, and the
United States has remained aloof in contrast to the political interests ex-
pressed in the cases of Russia and Turkey.
It appears clear from the foregoing review of country experiences that
the ﬁrst line of defense in dealing with ﬁnancial crisis calls for the strength-
496 Joshua Aizenmanening of domestic institutions and responsible government. At the same
time, there is a need for complementary international and bilateral mea-
sures to deal with (1) short-term liquidity problems, which are the tradi-
tional role of the IMF, and (2) more deep-rooted structural problems.
These structural problems may require arrangements for the rewriting of
debt contracts and possibly for establishing an international system of
bankruptcy procedures applied to nations.
In the ﬁnal analysis, the question that needs to be answered is how much
of a nation’s painful adjustment in time of crisis is to be borne by the na-
tion itself or shared with foreign creditors. In part, this may depend on
international politics, especially as far as the United States is concerned.
Otherwise, the country itself will shoulder most of the burden of adjust-
ment.
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